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I. INTRODUCTION
Long before the development of the regulatory takings doctrine,
courts discussed claims of uncompensated confiscatory practices in the
language of substantive due process and physical takings. Judicial
opinions even mixed both narratives in reaching conclusions that did
not provide a clear basis for the decision.1 As the degree of permanence,
directness, and physicality of the government act diminished, discussions of the claims included consideration of the impact of the government act on use value, the substantiality of interference, and foreseeability.2 These factors were important to distinguish between regular
torts like trespass and nuisance, on the one hand, and physical takings
and substantive due process deprivations, on the other.

* All rights reserved 2019. Lynda L. Butler. Chancellor Professor of Law and Director,
Property Rights Project, College of William & Mary Law School. B.S. College of William &
Mary; J.D. University of Virginia. I would like to thank the Law School for its summer
research grant support. Much appreciation to Dakota Newton, Lindsey Whitlow, Andrea
Gumushian, and Juan Abad for their superb research assistance, and Felicia Burton for her
dedicated word processing support.
1. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (upholding
for the first time a comprehensive zoning ordinance as a valid exercise of the police power,
concluding that the ordinance did not unlawfully confiscate the affected property’s value nor
deprive the owner of property without due process of law); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394, 413–14 (1915) (upholding a law prohibiting the manufacture of bricks within certain
areas that had become residential despite the loss in value of a business begun lawfully);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 624, 671 (1887) (upholding a law prohibiting the manufacture or sale of alcoholic beverages, even though the business was begun lawfully, because
the public health, safety, and morals required discontinuance of the use).
2. Lynda L. Butler, The Governance Function of Constitutional Property, 48 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1687, 1721–40 (2015) [hereinafter Butler, Governance Function].
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Then, in 1922, the Court announced what is now called the regulatory takings doctrine, declaring that regulations could go too far by
confiscating economically viable use. Writing for the Court, Justice
Holmes explained that such regulatory confiscation was functionally
equivalent to a physical taking.3 It took over fifty years for the Court
to flush out the meaning of this new doctrine with an ad hoc, multifactor test.4 Even now, significant questions remain about how to
measure economic impact, how to balance relevant factors, how to
handle nuisance-like impacts of property use, and whether compelling
public interests ever could justify significant economic impact without
payment of just compensation.5 Two themes underlying these issues
involve the importance of the reasonable expectations of property
owners and the role of state property law.
The 2017 decision by the United States Supreme Court in Murr v.
Wisconsin has heightened interest in these questions about the regulatory takings doctrine. In Murr, the Court concluded that the relevant
property interest to consider in resolving a regulatory takings claim
was the owners’ holdings in two adjacent lots.6 The two lots were
merged under state and local land use laws after coming under common ownership because of each lot’s nonconforming size.7 The logic of
the majority opinion highlights the continuing tensions between
substantive due process and takings analysis. That logic relies on a
new multi-factor test to define the property affected by the government
action for purposes of conducting regulatory takings analysis.8 According to the Court, the test is designed to determine “whether reasonable
expectations about property ownership would lead a landowner to
anticipate that his holdings would be treated” as one and not as
separate parcels.9 The Court cautioned, however, that a landowner’s
reasonable expectations should recognize that legitimate land use
3. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415–16 (1922).
4. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The three-part test considers the economic impact on the property, interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action. Id.
5. See, e.g., David L. Callies, Through a Glass Clearly: Predicting the Future in Land
Use Takings Law, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 43, 43–45, 103–04 (2014) (discussing the past ten years
of Public Use Clause interpretations, and the future of physical and regulatory takings
jurisprudence).
6. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1948 (2017).
7. See id.
8. The factors include: “the treatment of the land under state and local law; the physical characteristics of the land; and the prospective value of the regulated land.” Id. at 1945.
See also Maureen E. Brady, Essay, Penn Central Squared: What the Many Factors of Murr
v. Wisconsin Mean for Property Federalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 55–56 (2017) (discussing how Murr “poses a severe risk to constitutional property federalism,” undermining
the property law of individual states and replacing that law with “an analysis of reasonable
property rules and expectations that is divorced from jurisdictional boundaries”).
9. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
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restrictions may apply to the property and affect value or limit use in
light of the physical characteristics of the property.10 The majority
opinion added that “reasonable land-use regulations do not work a
taking,” but rather are “a legitimate exercise of the government’s
police power”11—a statement that sounds remarkably like due process
analysis.
This article examines the confusion surrounding constitutional
protection of property under the substantive due process and takings
clauses, using Murr as a springboard for reconsidering the substantive
due process/takings distinction and asking whether the regulatory
takings doctrine should remain a viable constitutional concept despite
its muddled principles. While powerful reasons support treating as
compensable economic regulations that are functionally equivalent
to physical takings,12 important differences between physical and
regulatory takings need to be recognized as limits to the degree of
equivalence possible and therefore to the regulatory takings doctrine.
A look back at the evolutionary paths of substantive due process,
physical takings, and regulatory takings reveals those differences and
provides some answers to questions about the regulatory takings
doctrine. Defining the scope of the regulatory takings doctrine in
light of those differences, especially the forgotten history of regulatory
takings, should provide more consistency, help to resolve constitutional property’s denominator puzzle, and allow regulatory takings to
remain a viable constitutional concept.
II. MURR V. WISCONSIN AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROPERTY’S DENOMINATOR PUZZLE
For decades the Supreme Court has generally agreed that regulations producing a total diminution in value should be compensated.13
It has struggled, however, with identifying the point when a total economic loss occurs. Central to that struggle is the choice of the property
benchmark or denominator. The Court’s repeated attempts to define
the benchmark reveal a basic unease with the question and with
the choices before it. A look at the development of the denominator
debate over the years and the Court’s recent efforts in Murr to resolve
it provides an important backdrop for exploring the inherent limits of
regulatory takings.

10. See id. at 1945–46.
11. Id. at 1947.
12. See Richard A. Epstein, Disappointed Expectations: How the Supreme Court Failed
to Clean up Takings Law in Murr v. Wisconsin, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 151, 184–89 (2017)
(discussing some of those reasons).
13. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026–29 (1992).
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A. The Puzzle
From the very beginning, the regulatory takings doctrine has had
a denominator problem. In introducing the concept of regulatory takings in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Justice Holmes used the remaining property as the benchmark—or denominator—for measuring
the economic impact of the statute.14 Once he chose the remaining coal
that could not be mined under the statute as the basis for comparing
the before and after effect of the challenged law, the outcome of the
case was determined. All of the remaining property could no longer be
mined, producing a 100% loss.15 The dissenting opinion by Brandeis,
on the other hand, focused on the property as a whole in measuring
the economic impact of the law on the property.16 According to
Brandeis, the appropriate approach is to compare the value of the affected property—the coal kept in place—with the value of the property
as a whole. Brandeis explained that “[t]he sum of the rights in the
parts can not [sic] be greater than the rights in the whole.”17
Cases decided after Mahon have, for the most part, taken the
approach of Justice Brandeis, comparing the value of the affected
property to the value of the property as a whole in determining the
extent of the diminution in value caused by the government act.18 In
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, for example, the
Court concluded that the owner of Grand Central Terminal could not
vertically segment the property and treat the owner’s interests in
developing above the historic property as the whole property impacted
by the government’s denial of a development application.19 The landowner had argued that the government’s decision not to allow development of the air space above the terminal totally took the owner’s air
rights.20 In rejecting this vertical severance argument, the Court
explained that “‘[t]aking[s]’ jurisprudence does not divide a single
parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights
in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.”21 Rather the
Court’s focus is on rights in the property “as a whole.”22
14. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413–15 (1922). Epstein disagrees that Mahon
is the source of the denominator problem, instead attributing the origins of the problem to
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See Epstein, supra note 12, at 162–
63.
15. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414.
16. See id. at 416, 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 644
(1993); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978).
19. 438 U.S. 104, 117, 130–31 (1978).
20. Id. at 130.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 130–31.
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Soon after deciding Penn Central, the Court rejected use of a conceptual severance argument in Andrus v. Allard.23 Endorsing the
“aggregate” or “as a whole” approach, the Court held that a regulation
prohibiting the sale of lawfully acquired eagle feathers and other covered bird parts was not a taking.24 After observing that the law did not
result in a physical invasion or forced surrender of possession, the
Court explained that “the denial of one traditional property right does
not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a
full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the
bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its
entirety.”25 Although the regulation did not allow the most profitable
use of their property, diminution in value was not enough to find a
taking. In Andrus the owners still retained the rights to possess, enjoy,
donate, and devise the property.26
The Court’s decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council27
did more than any other case to highlight the outcome-determinative
nature of the denominator question. In Lucas the Court decided that a
government law denying all economically viable use was categorically
a regulatory taking without any “case-specific inquiry into the public
interest advanced in support of the restraint.”28 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia offered a number of justifications for this categorical
rule. In addition to being functionally equivalent to a physical appropriation, a law that deprived the property owner of all economically
viable use could not simply be “adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life” to promote the public good in ways that would provide
the owner with “average reciprocity of advantage.”29 The Court
acknowledged, however, that its decision in Lucas was not providing
guidance on the appropriate property benchmark because the record
before it assumed a total loss.30 Instead the Court indicated that resolution of the benchmark question “may lie in how the owner’s reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State’s law of property—
i.e., whether and to what degree the State’s law has accorded legal
recognition and protection to the particular interest in land” allegedly
taken by government regulation.31 Because of the Court’s adoption of
23. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65–66 (1979).
24. See id. at 64, 67–68.
25. Id. at 65–66.
26. See id. at 66.
27. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
28. Id. at 1015.
29. Id. at 1017–18 (first quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978), then quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
30. Id. at 1016 n.7.
31. Id.
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the per se approach, the choice of denominator became even more critical. If the regulated property interest was also the benchmark, then
the diminution in value would always be total and therefore a per se
taking unless the restriction was inherent in the owner’s title, part of
the background principles of common law property and nuisance.32 The
public interest, no matter how compelling, could not be considered if
the per se approach applied.
Then, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Court rejected a landowner’s horizontal severance argument, concluding that the government’s denial of a permit to fill eleven acres of wetlands on an eighteen-acre tract was not a regulatory taking.33 The Court explained that
the landowner could still develop on the upland portion of the tract.34
Despite expressing some “discomfort” about the denominator issue,
the Court continued to look at the property as a whole in evaluating
the economic impact of the regulatory decision.35 Development of a residence on the upland area provided sufficient economically viable use
to avoid a regulatory taking even though the denial deprived the owner
of the ability to pursue a use of potentially greater value—a private
beach club.36
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, the Court similarly concluded that the appropriate focus
in evaluating the economic impact of a law was on the property as a
whole.37 Landowners had argued that temporary moratoria delaying
economic use of their land denied them all economically viable use
for the moratoria period and therefore was a regulatory taking.38
The regional planning agency had adopted the moratoria to give the
agency time to develop a plan for protecting the water quality of Lake
Tahoe.39 The Court rejected the effort to “disaggregate[] . . . property
into temporal segments corresponding to the regulations at issue”
and held that the temporary prohibition of economic use was not per

32. See id. at 1029.
33. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 615, 631–32 (2001).
34. See id. at 616.
35. Id. at 630–32.
36. See id. (describing the denominator problem as a “difficult, persisting question” but
noting that the landowner failed to challenge the denominator test prior to reaching the
Supreme Court, and instead accepting how the case came to the Court – on “the premise that
petitioner’s entire parcel serves as the basis” for the takings claim).
37. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327
(2002).
38. See id. at 320.
39. See id. at 308–12.
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se a taking.40 The Court explained, “defining the property interest
taken in terms of the very regulation being challenged is circular.”41
The denominator question reflects both a potential for windfalls
and a problem of manipulation. Under the “as a whole” approach, the
government usually wins, able to achieve a regulatory goal without
paying for diminution in value or sometimes even for a lost strand
in the bundle of property rights.42 This result should not matter when
the regulation addresses a harmful use or otherwise holds property
owners accountable for the impacts of their use. Nothing in our
Constitution guarantees property owners protection from laws that
force internalization of the costs of their land uses. The result might
matter, however, when government is able to capture some of the
property’s value through regulation after manipulating the regulatory
context to get a favorable “whole.” Under the “regulated portion” or
“remaining property” approach, however, the private property owner
usually wins and may even capture some of the value provided by
public goods or services or may harm those goods or services. The property owner now has the incentive to segment her property interests
before pursuing development plans. While shaping the regulatory
context allows manipulation by government actors, segmentation
allows manipulation by property owners. When the opportunity for
manipulation overlaps with the potential for windfalls (and the
capture of value), the Court faces a no-win situation in resolving a regulatory takings claim. Regardless of the Court’s choice of denominator,
the decision often leads to unsatisfactory constitutional law. Identifying when both problems overlap in a regulatory context thus is critical
to improving the Court’s options and decision-making.
When, then, does a windfall arise in a regulatory takings context?
A windfall generally exists when a party receives a benefit or advantage that it did not bargain for, invest in, or buy.43 When both
parties have faced a potential windfall and the situation did not involve manipulation or bad faith behavior on their part, some courts
have resolved disputes involving this pure windfall situation by
looking for ways to make each innocent party with a reasonable connection to the windfall better off. For example, in a case about a recordsetting homerun baseball hit by Barry Bonds, the court split the
baseball’s value between the party who had the baseball in his glove
before being mobbed by a group of fans and the innocent bystander

40. Id. at 331–32.
41. Id. at 331.
42. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1944–45 (explaining how the denominator question is “outcome
determinative”).
43. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1(b) (AM.
LAW INST. 2011) (defining non-bargained-for benefits).
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who picked up the ball after it rolled out of the melee.44 When a windfall situation, on the other hand, involves bad faith or manipulation,
common law courts have looked to principles of restitution and equity
to rule against the wrongdoer and award the windfall to the innocent
party having the closest or best connection to the property. In a case
involving an egg washing machine, for instance, the court held that
the wrongdoer who misappropriated the owner’s egg washing machine
had to disgorge all profits made from the wrongful use of the machine
instead of just paying the fair rental value of the machine.45 The
wrongdoer had taken the machine out of the owner’s storage area and
used it after a labor shortage caused labor costs to rise above the costs
of renting the machine.46
Whether windfalls, or non-bargained-for benefits, arising in a regulatory context involve manipulation through abuse of power or
rights is a more complex question. Sometimes the answer may be tied
to notions of fairness. Other times it may be tied to views on the allocation of power between government and property owners. Three
opinions in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island illustrate different approaches
to defining windfalls in the regulatory context.47 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy described a windfall as arising when a state
law “would work a critical alteration to the nature of property.”48
Declaring that government “may not by this means secure a windfall
for itself,” Justice Kennedy explained how the law being challenged
removed the ability of “the newly regulated landowner . . . to transfer
the interest which was possessed prior to the regulation.”49 In Justice
O’Connor’s concurring opinion, she described windfalls in regulatory
takings cases as “an important indicium of fairness.”50 She explained
how government could have too much power if existing regulations always dictated the reasonableness of a property owner’s expectations,
while property owners could “reap [unacceptable] windfalls” if existing
regulations played no role in regulatory takings analysis.51 She therefore rejected a per se approach that forever made the “temporal
relationship between regulatory enactment and title acquisition”

44. See, e.g., Popov v. Hayashi, 2002 Cal. Super. LEXIS 5206 (Dec. 18, 2002) (applying
the principle of equitable division); see also Keron v. Cashman, 33 A. 1055 (1896) (holding
that because each boy had an equal legal claim to the property, they each had an equal
entitlement to the property).
45. See Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652, 653–54 (Wash. 1946).
46. See id.
47. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
48. Id. at 627.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
51. Id.
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determinative in a partial regulatory takings case.52 Instead, both the
time of a regulation’s enactment and the time of title acquisition would
remain material to the analysis.53 Justice Scalia, on the other hand,
would always award the windfall to the property owner instead of the
government, “which not only did not lose something it owned, but is
. . . the cause of the miscarriage of ‘fairness.’ ”54 In his concurring opinion in Palazzolo, he explains how there is nothing unlawful or
unfair about buying land subject to a development restriction and
then developing the land to its full value after getting the restriction
invalidated.55
If a government regulation promotes the common good while causing significant but not total diminution in value, has the government
unfairly received a windfall or benefit? Those who do not believe
that government regulation should be able to cause a significant diminution in value without providing compensation when no direct harm
results from the property’s use would probably conclude that government has wrongfully and unconstitutionally taken some of the owner’s
property interests.56 Those who believe that the boundaries of a tract
of land existing at the time of acquisition are inviolate would also likely
conclude that a regulation depriving the landowner of economically
viable use of part of the tract results in an unconstitutional windfall.
Such a situation would arise, for instance, when a local government
imposed front and side setback requirements on the development of
land for residential purposes.
This thinking, however, ignores government’s role in adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life, including the spillovers of
private land use borne by third parties, the costs to public goods and
services, and the interaction of the parts (here the individual tracts)
making up the whole.57 If a regulation adjusts the benefits and burdens
of economic life or provides average reciprocity of advantage, the
property owner is not likely being singled out or treated unfairly. If
instead a regulation imposes a disproportionate share of the costs on
a landowner, then the regulation probably produces an inappropriate
windfall for government. When government extracts a public benefit
from a few, the government action raises concerns that the action is
52. Id. at 632.
53. Id. at 632–35.
54. Id. at 636–37 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
55. Id. at 635–37.
56. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 12, at 183–84 (concluding that “there is no obvious
tipping point . . . when compensation is suddenly required” for significant diminution in
value caused by regulation).
57. This interaction can produce cumulative harm and stress on the whole. See Lynda
L. Butler, Property as a Management Institution, 82 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1215, 1252–53, 1260–
62 (2017) [hereinafter Butler, Property as Management].
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unfairly redistributing wealth from the private property owner to
the government.58 An unfair windfall also could occur if government
appropriates resources for a uniquely public function in a way that denies an owner economically viable use59 or if government alone
defines when expectations are reasonable.60 Because the focus of the
compensable takings inquiry is on what the property owner has lost,
not on what may generally be gained by others, a windfall received by
government should not, in and of itself, be enough to find a regulatory
taking as long as that gain has not been acquired unfairly or from the
abuse of power.61
An important step in identifying problematic situations in the regulatory takings context thus involves understanding the source of a
potential windfall and determining whether the windfall has been
wrongfully acquired by manipulation, whether by abuse of rights or
abuse of power. Sometimes the source of the windfall is self-created.
The property owner, for example, might have speculated that a shift
in the market or a change in land use regulations would occur. If that
shift does not occur and government then benefits after applying the
existing regulations to the property, the property owner assumes the
risk of this type of loss. Other times the regulatory context has been
shaped by the failure or limitations of the property system in handling
the harmful impacts and costs of private land use. This failure may be
due to the exclusion-based strategy that the conventional property
system uses in managing the exercise of property rights or to the
economics-based incentive structure of the system. The management
strategy and incentive structure are owner-centric, limit consideration
of third-party interests, and sometimes experience difficulty
responding to changing conditions, technological advances, or new

58. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978) (noting that the
Court “has been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when . . . economic injuries caused by public action [should] be compensated . . . rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons”); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)
(describing how “[the] Fifth Amendment guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole. . . .”).
59. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261–62, 264–67 (1946) (holding that lowlying military flights over private land directly caused a taking by preventing use as a
chicken farm and is just “as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional entry upon it”).
60. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632, 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the state
“wields far too much power” when “existing regulations dictate the reasonableness of [investment-backed] expectations in every instance”).
61. See Brown v. Legal Foundation of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 234–36 (2003) (concluding
that a law requiring attorneys to put client funds that could not otherwise earn interest in
accounts earning interest for programs providing indigent legal services did not require compensation because the owner did not lose any interest).
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knowledge.62 Regardless of the reason for the failure, the property
system needs to address its limitations so it can respond effectively
to new conditions and crises. Finally, government’s decision-making
process or its execution of laws might have played a role in shaping a
landowner’s expectations by inviting or authorizing the development
that is now being constrained by new regulations.
Consider, for example, a landowner who owns a ten-acre tract, one
acre of which consists of wetlands that cannot be developed under a
wetlands law already in effect. If government prevents the development of the wetlands, the owner has lost all economically viable use of
that one acre—a taking under Lucas if the benchmark is the affected
portion but not if the ten-acre tract is viewed as a whole. Either option
allows one party to manipulate the situation. Suppose further that the
owner submits a plan to subdivide the tract into ten lots, with one of
the lots consisting of the wetlands. Even under the “as a whole” approach, the owner has lost all economically viable use of the wetlands
lot and has suffered a taking unless the whole is defined as the original, undivided ten-acre tract or unless knowledge or foreseeability of
the wetlands law legitimately shaped reasonable investment-backed
expectations.63 The possibility of subdivision allows the owner to
manipulate the situation to the owner’s advantage unless the entire
original tract is the whole. If, instead, the government had approved
the subdivision as the owner proposed but later denied the owner’s
application for a permit to fill the wetlands under a law already in
effect at the time of subdivision, government has failed to regulate
effectively. Government had control over the subdivision process,
allowing the subdivision of the one acre of wetlands, and could have
prevented or avoided the strategic manipulation by the owner. By
approving the subdivision, the locality has helped to shape the owner’s
expectations, which could matter under takings analysis.
Now suppose that the owner subdivides the ten-acre tract, with the
one acre of wetlands constituting one lot. After the subdivision, the
62. See Butler, Property as Management, supra note 57, at 1217–18, 1220–22, 1226–28,
1239–41. Earlier in time, for example, waterfront businesses and localities discharged untreated wastewater into navigable waters. After the harmful impact of the discharges
became better understood, governments began regulating these discharges and protecting
public rights in navigable waters. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine
Cty., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (using the public trust doctrine to restrict the withdrawal of
water from Mono Lake when the withdrawals threatened the integrity of the Lake). For a
discussion of how a governance strategy provides greater analytical capacity to resolve
constitutional issues involving shared resources subject to complex property arrangements,
see Butler, Governance Function, supra note 2, at 1757–67.
63. Because of the Court’s decision in Palazzolo, notice of regulations in effect at the
time of acquisition of property cannot be determinative of a takings claim. See Palazzolo, 533
U.S. at 626–28, 631 (discussing the notice issue and describing how framing the wetlands
parcel as separate and distinct from the uplands parcel could change the denominator and
potentially present a total deprivation of value, depending on the approach taken).
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government passes a wetlands law preventing development of the one
acre of wetlands in response to new studies about the importance of
wetlands to ecological integrity and public welfare. The government in
this third scenario is likely to make a Murr-type argument, asserting
that the ten-acre tract should be viewed as a whole. The situation now
could resemble Lucas, depending on the degree of development of the
surrounding area and the condition of the ecological resources being
protected by the new law. In Lucas, the development of the surrounding beaches was too far along for a prohibition on development of two
noncontiguous lots to be effective.64 Whether changing conditions or
new knowledge about those conditions led to the adoption of the
wetlands law would matter. But the current degree of development in
the area and the potential effectiveness of the law also would matter.
The above scenarios identify several categories of regulatory settings that could involve overlap of potential windfalls and problematic
manipulation. In the first scenario involving a law already in effect
at the time of development, the property owner could gain a windfall
by manipulating his rights under existing law. The landowner had
subdivided the wetlands portion of the tract into a separate lot, hoping
to prevail with a Lucas takings claim if the fill permit were denied.
The landowner intentionally pursued ecological segmentation of his
property yet could have foreseen denial of the permit under an already
existing law protecting wetlands. Surely an unhealthy manipulation
of rights exists when a landowner segments the property to try to fit
under Lucas and overcome application of a law protecting against
environmental harms of land use. In the second scenario involving an
existing law, one unit of government approved the subdivision even
though the wetlands law was in effect, but then another denied the fill
permit. The narrow economic incentives of the property system help to
explain this management failure. The mainstream property system
generally ignores the true scales of private land use and instead
promotes the owner’s economic incentives and the maximization of
social welfare. The system is unable to respond effectively to certain
serious problems involving high transaction costs, collection action
problems, and difficult-to-measure spillovers like diffused or cumulative harms. The limitations of the economics-based property system
thus make the development of solutions within in the current system
difficult to achieve.65
64. William A. Fischel, Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council: A Photographic Essay
(Feb. 1995), http://www.dartmouth.edu/%7Ewfischel/lucasessay.html [https://perma.cc/
D9GM-TBKA].
65. The economics-based incentive structure of the property system contributes to the
development of investment-backed expectations that do not account for serious external
harms. See Butler, Property as Management, supra note 57, at 1257–59. For example,
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The third scenario involves new knowledge or changing conditions
not specifically attributable to either party and therefore less likely to
involve an overlap of windfalls and the potential for manipulation. For
instance, when technological advances eventually allowed the removal
of most of the coal in a mine’s support columns without jeopardizing
miners’ safety, the Supreme Court concluded, in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, that a law passed to prevent surface subsidence went
too far and took all commercially practical use of the coal.66 According
to the Court, the law was, in effect, confiscating the remaining mineral
estate of the coal company for the benefit of the surface owners
contrary to their private property transactions.67 What further
strengthened the coal company’s position was the distinct recognition
given to mineral estates under Pennsylvania law.68 A closer call may
well involve the development of new technology that allows the
withdrawal of oil or gas from shale deposits through the use of deep
horizontal drilling, sometimes beginning miles away.69 When the
development of new technology or scientific understandings leads to
new ways to exploit natural resources, reforms to traditional laws
governing property rights in those natural resources should be allowed
to address issues raised by the new technology without necessarily
having to pay just compensation. Conceptual segmentation of interconnected resources should not control regulatory takings analysis,
especially when the new use causes harm to interests in connected
resources that was not foreseen at the time of the private transactions.
A discussion of the Murr decision will now address the complexities
of windfall and regulatory situations that have led to the unsatisfactory denominator choices before the Court.

Manhattan developers are clamoring to build along the southwest edge of Central Park,
dubbed “Billionaire‘s Row.” These apartments and condominiums will cast shadows on portions of the park, dropping the temperature by twenty degrees and harming vegetation. See
Jenna McKnight, Wave of super-tall towers in Manhattan sparks protests over shadows,
DEZEEN, (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.dezeen.com/2015/11/11/supertall-skinny-skyscraperstowers-manhattan-new-york-shop-architects-robert-stern-rafaely-vinoly-jean-nouvelportzamparc-controversy-protest/ [https://perma.cc/LQD9-LPDH].
66. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 394–95 (1922).
67. Id. at 415.
68. Id. at 414–15.
69. For a discussion of issues surrounding hydraulic fracturing, or fracking as it is more
commonly known, see David L. Callies & Chynna Stone, Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing,
1 J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2014); Tim Flannery, Fury over Fracking, N.Y. REVIEW OF
BOOKS, (Apr. 21 2016), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/04/21/fury-over-fracking/
[https://perma.cc/V6KB-UP6P]; Amy Goodman, Shale-Shocked Citizens Fight Back,
TRUTHDIG (Sept. 20, 2012), https://www.truthdig.com/articles/shale-shocked-citizens-fightback [https://perma.cc/ET7W-XDDT].
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B. The Murr Opinion
The controversy in Murr involved land use regulations that
prevented the separate development or sale of adjoining lots held
under common ownership when the lots were substandard in size.70
The tracts were located in an area covered by the Wild and Scenic
Rivers legislation limiting development to protect “the wild, scenic and
recreational qualities of the river for present and future generations.”71
One of the protective devices used under the law was a building lot law
that prevented separate development of a lot having less than one acre
of land suitable for development.72 A grandfather clause, however,
allowed a lot substandard at the effective date of the regulation to be
used as a distinct building site.73 But if another substandard adjacent
lot subsequently came under common ownership, a merger provision
prevented the adjacent lots from being developed or sold separately.74
The lots at issue in Murr each had less than one acre suitable
for development due to their topography.75 Petitioners’ parents had
purchased their non-conforming lots at different times before the
building lot restriction took effect.76 After the lots came under common
ownership, the merger provision treated the non-conforming lots as
one parcel for purposes of use and development, blocking the landowners from selling one of the lots to finance new development on the
other.77 When the local government denied their variance application,
the landowners sued in state court, claiming a regulatory taking of
the lot they planned to sell due to their near total loss of economically
viable use.78 Petitioners’ evidence of the loss included appraisals of
$771,000 for the lots if separately developed, $698,300 for the lots as
regulated, $373,000 for the lot they wanted to retain and redevelop,
and $40,000 for the lot they were not allowed to sell separately.79 The
state courts ruled for the government, concluding that the landowners
still could use and enjoy both tracts of land together and that the
70. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1941 (2017).
71. Under the Federal Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, the St. Croix River acquired federal
protection by 1972. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1274(a)(6), (9) (2012). This designation meant that
Wisconsin was required to develop a management program for the river. See WIS. STAT. §
30.27 (2019) (regarding Lower St. Croix River preservation).
72. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1940–41.
78. Id. at 1941. Flooding on one of the lots apparently motivated the decision to build a
new cabin on that lot. See Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 796 N.W.2d 837, 841
(Wis. Ct. App. 2011).
79. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941.
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diminution in value was not significant.80 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals further explained that regulatory takings analysis focuses “on
the Murrs’ property as a whole[.]”81 The appellate court stressed that
the landowners “could not reasonably have expected to use the lots
separately because they [should have known about] existing zoning
laws[.]”82
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy began his takings analysis with a brief review of the development of regulatory takings
jurisprudence. After discussing the origins of the doctrine in Mahon,
Justice Kennedy identified two guidelines relevant to the Murr controversy: the categorical rule that a regulation denying all economically
viable use generally would be a regulatory taking and the “complex of
factors” that must be considered when a regulation restricts use but
does not deprive all economically viable use.83 Even the categorical
rule, however, had a “caveat recognizing the relevance of state law and
land-use customs”: if the challenged restrictions reflected background
principles of the state law of property and nuisance, a total loss of
economically viable use would not be a regulatory taking.84 The Court’s
regulatory takings jurisprudence reflected, in Justice Kennedy’s
words, a “central dynamic” of flexibility that was important to “reconcil[ing] two competing objectives” at play in regulatory takings cases:
protection of individual property rights fundamental to an individual’s
freedom and the government’s promotion of the public good through
the adjusting of rights and interests.85
The Court then turned to the question critical to determine whether
a regulatory takings had occurred: “What [was] the proper unit of
property against which to assess the effect of the challenged governmental action?”86 If the choice of denominator was the portion of
property that was affected, then “that portion is always taken in its
entirety.”87 Justice Kennedy justified the need to avoid this circularity
by distinguishing between a regulatory taking and a physical taking.88
While a regulatory taking focuses on the impact of the challenged law
on the value of the owner’s property, a physical taking examines the

80. Id.
81. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
82. Id. at 1942.
83. Id. at 1942–43 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. Id. at 1943.
85. Id. at 1937.
86. Id. at 1943.
87. Id. at 1944 (quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508
U.S. 602, 644 (1993)).
88. Id. at 1944.
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normally evident effect of the physical invasion or appropriation.89 The
Court then rejected two “unduly narrow” approaches to the property
denominator.90 One would limit the denominator to that portion of
property regulated by the law, which would “overstate the effect of the
regulation” on the value of the property, turning even a delay into a
total loss.91 The second would allow state law to control the choice,
defining the relevant property coextensively with state laws delineating and affecting the property.92 Such an approach would give the
states “unfettered authority to ‘shape . . . property rights and reasonable investment-backed expectations’ ” and allow government to
“fortify the state law against a takings claim.” 93
To help answer the critical question, the majority opinion outlined
a new set of factors that courts “must consider” in determining the
denominator.94 The first factor concerned how land is handled under
state and local laws, especially “how it is bounded or divided.”95 The
reasonable expectations of a purchaser “must acknowledge legitimate
restrictions affecting his or her subsequent use and dispensation of the
property.”96 The timing of the enactment of a law would not be determinative, though a preexisting restriction could shape an owner’s
reasonable expectations.97 Significantly, “a use restriction which is
triggered only after, or because of, a change in ownership should also
guide a court’s assessment of reasonable private expectations.”98 As
the dissent points out, this first factor appears to be blending—or perhaps confusing—the question of whether a taking exists with the
choice of denominator.99
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Lucas may have stimulated Justice
Kennedy’s confusing analysis by tying the choice of denominator to the
degree to which the reasonable expectations of the property owner
have been shaped by state law. There Justice Scalia mentioned in a
footnote that the choice of denominator “may lie in how the owner’s
reasonable expectations have been shaped by . . . whether and to what
degree the [s]tate’s law has accorded legal recognition and protection
to the particular interest in land” claimed to have been taken by
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1944–45 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001)).
94. See id. at 1945.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 1950, 55–56 (Robert, J., dissenting) (explaining how the majority approach
confuses the “traditional touchstone for spotting a taking” with “defining private property”).
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the diminution in value.100 Justice Scalia’s remarks focused on how
state law recognizes and defines the property interest, not on how
restrictions on use may affect the exercise of the interest. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, for example, Pennsylvania law had long
recognized the mineral estate as a separate estate in land.101 In Murr,
however, Justice Kennedy’s discussion of the first factor, treatment
under state law, appears to expand the analysis to include how the use
restriction being challenged shapes an owner’s reasonable expectations for purposes of determining the denominator. Though the
economic impact of the restriction should be considered in conducting
regulatory takings analysis, Justice Kennedy brought the discussion
of economic impact into the determination of the denominator before
the Court considered whether a regulatory taking existed. Yet, in
choosing the property benchmark in Murr, a court should focus on
whether state law typically treats two substandard, contiguous lots as
one or instead as separate tracts.
The second factor focused on the physical characteristics of the
land.102 The tract’s topography, physical relationship with other tracts,
and the surrounding environment all would be relevant considerations.103 For example, a court could consider whether the property is
“an area that is subject to, or likely to become subject to, environmental or other regulation.”104 As support, Justice Kennedy quoted from
his concurring opinion in Lucas where he noted: “Coastal property may
present such unique concerns for a fragile land system that the State
can go further in regulating its development and use than the common
law of nuisance might otherwise permit.”105
The third factor involved assessing the value of the property
affected by the regulation, “with special attention to the effect of
burdened land on the value of other holdings.”106 Diminution in value
of the regulated land, for example, could be “tempered if the regulated
land adds value to the remaining property.”107 Added value could result
from greater recreational space, increased privacy, or preserved natural spaces.108 The “absence of a special relationship” between the
different tracts, however, would weigh against viewing the tracts as

100. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
101. 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
102. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1945–46.
105. Id. at 1946 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal
quotations omitted)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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one, indicating a possible taking.109 A special relationship could exist,
though, if a restriction on one tract protects or enhances use of the
other tract.110
After setting forth its new three-factor test for determining the
denominator, the Court explained why it was rejecting the suggested
approaches of both the government and the property owners. “Neither
proposal . . . capture[s] the central legal and factual principles that
inform reasonable expectations about property interests.”111 The
government’s approach would link the choice of denominator to state
law in a way that allows the government to avoid having to justify a
regulation in light of its impact on the legitimate expectations of
property owners.112 Though state law is an important consideration,
courts must consider whether the regulation is consistent “with other
indicia of reasonable expectations about property.”113 The approach of
the property owners, on the other hand, would have had the Court
presume that lot lines or boundaries define the relevant parcel.114
Noting that lot lines are also “creatures of state law,” the Court rejected the petitioners’ idea of choosing state law principles that favor
their position while ignoring other legal principles.115 Those overlooked
principles included the merger provision, which was adopted as part
of a regulatory scheme to allow development in areas protected under
wild and scenic river legislation while preserving open space.116 Local
building lot laws set minimum lot sizes for development and then use
the merger concept to decrease the number of non-conforming lots
when adjacent substandard lots come under common ownership.117
“The merger provision . . . balanc[es] the legitimate goals of regulation
with the reasonable expectations of landowners.”118 Treating lot lines
as determinative would incentivize landowners expecting future
regulation to adjust their boundaries and engage in manipulation or
“gamesmanship.”119
The Court then applied its new multi-factor test for the property
benchmark and concluded that the two adjacent lots should be viewed
as one parcel.120 The majority explained that state and local law
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1946–47.
Id. at 1947.
Id.
Id. at 1940, 1947.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1948.
Id.
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supported this conclusion because the merger provision kicked in after
the petitioners voluntarily became owners of both lots and reflected
“the widespread understanding that lot lines are not dominant or
controlling in every case.”121 The merger of two substandard, adjacent
lots applied after the lots were acquired by the same owner and balanced the public interest in developable lots and the landowners’
interests, thus shaping the owners’ reasonable expectations.122 The
physical characteristics of the lots also supported the Court’s decision
to treat them as one. Their adjacency, rough terrain and narrow shape,
and location next to a river designated as wild and scenic all indicated
that use of the lots would be limited.123 Finally, the prospective value
from using the two lots as an integrated whole exceeded the aggregate
value of each of the lots used separately, suggesting a “complementarity” between the two.124
Viewing the property as a whole, the Court concluded that economically viable use existed and therefore no total Lucas taking had
occurred.125 Nor could the Court find a partial regulatory taking under
the Penn Central test.126 The economic impact was not severe enough,
and the petitioners’ reasonable expectations did not include the expectation of selling or developing substandard lots that had come under
common ownership.127 Finally, the merger provision was part of a
reasonable land use regulatory scheme shaping the expectations of the
property owners.128
Joined by Justices Thomas and Alito in dissent, Chief Justice
Roberts initially admitted that the majority’s “bottom-line conclusion
does not trouble [him],” stating, “the majority presents a fair case that
the Murrs can still make good use of both lots and that the ordinance
is a commonplace tool to preserve scenic areas.”129 He disagreed, however, with the “elaborate” test used by the majority, preferring instead
to follow the traditional approach to defining property rights. 130 Under
that approach, “[s]tate law defines the boundaries of distinct parcels
of land, and those boundaries should determine the ‘private property’
at issue in regulatory takings cases.”131 The Takings Clause, in other

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1949.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1949–50.
Id. at 1950 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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words, protects property rights as “established” by state law.132
Whether a regulatory taking exists is a question distinct from the
choice of the property benchmark.133 Resolving that overriding takings
question can involve other considerations like the adjacency and common ownership of two lots—considerations that the majority swept up
in its new factor approach to identifying the property denominator.134
In introducing the Court’s basic principles of regulatory takings,
Chief Justice Roberts accepted the logic of regulatory takings as laid
out by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.135 That logic
stressed that, though regulatory takings are more indirect than
physical takings, the Court must also protect private property against
regulation that goes too far.136 Otherwise the “natural tendency of
human nature” would take over, extending regulation “until at last
private property disappears.”137 The Chief Justice also accepted that
regulatory takings are not generally defined by per se rules, though
“a few fixed principles” do exist.138 One of those principles is that
regulatory takings analysis “must be conducted with respect to specific
property.”139 A second provides that a regulation denying all economically viable use constitutes a taking.140 Other than these fixed rules,
the regulatory takings doctrine uses a more flexible approach to determine whether the government regulation forces an owner “to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole.”141
Recognizing that a narrow approach to defining the relevant property would “threaten[] the careful balance between property rights and
government authority” struck by the Court’s regulatory takings
doctrine, the Chief Justice reaffirmed the “as a whole” test for identifying the denominator.142 Under state law the whole of a tract of land
generally was defined by the boundaries of the tract absent “the most
exceptional circumstances.”143 He explained that property rights exist
132. Id. (emphasis in original).
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 1951.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1951 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495
(1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
140. See id. at 1951–52.
141. Id. at 1952 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1953.
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in a particular thing—here a tract of land that is “horizontally
bounded;” that “thing[]” should not vary according to the purpose or
issue.144 By looking to state law to define the boundaries of the whole,
his approach removed the “risk of strategic unbundling,” preventing
an owner from successfully claiming a single strand has been taken.145
An inquiry into the reasonableness of the owners’ expectations
about developing each lot was not, in the Chief Justice’s view, an
appropriate part of defining the relevant parcel.146 Rather those expectations, as well as other factors identified by the majority’s new test,
related to the question of whether a regulatory taking of the relevant
parcel had occurred.147 Otherwise “the effectiveness of the Takings
Clause as a check on the government’s power to shift the cost[s] of
public life onto private [property]” would be undermined.148 According
to Chief Justice Roberts, the majority approach allows greater consideration of government interests by shifting the definition of the
relevant property from state law considerations to the reasonableness
of the government’s regulatory interests.149
Though many hoped that the Court in Murr would settle the denominator question definitively and satisfactorily, the opinions of
Justices Kennedy and Roberts fail to achieve those results.150 The
majority opinion continues the trend of mixing substantive due process
and takings analysis,151 and, in the process, heightens the federalism
dimension of constitutional property.152 At one point in his opinion,
Justice Kennedy affirmatively states that the Court’s case law “recognizes that reasonable land-use regulations do not work a taking.”153
He then points as support to the Court’s decision in Agins v. City of
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1953–54.
146. Id. at 1952–53.
147. Id. at 1954.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 1955.
150. Indeed, reform legislation has already been enacted in at least one jurisdiction to
ban use of a common land use tool—the merger doctrine—for contiguous lots owned by one
party without permission. See Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 711, 722
(2010) (remitting the determination of relevant parcel to the trial court, due to the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry); Michael M. Berger, Ruminations on Takings Law in Honor of
David Callies, 7 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 17, 28–29 (2018); James W. Ely, Jr.,
Governmental Forbearance: Myth or Reality?, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 125,
125 (2014).
151. Accord Brady, supra note 8 (arguing that Murr’s new three-factor test is problematic, complicating takings analysis and ruining constitutional property federalism, and will
inevitably lead to inconsistent outcomes).
152. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 205 (2004) (discussing how takings jurisprudence is shaped by
federalism concerns).
153. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1947.
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Tiburon, describing Agins as upholding zoning regulations against a
takings challenge “as a legitimate exercise of the government’s police
power.”154 Justice Kennedy acknowledged that a later case, Lingle v.
Chevron, limited Agins—because of Agins’s use of a “substantially
advance” test—to ensure that a heightened review standard was not
used to evaluate the effectiveness of laws.155 He, however, stressed
that Agins survived the Lingle decision even though the Agins test was
“imprecise.”156 Then, in applying its multi-factor denominator test to
identify the property benchmark, he speaks in terms of the central
“purposes of this takings inquiry” and the legitimacy of treating
the lots as one parcel under the merger doctrine.157 As Chief Justice
Roberts observed, the majority shifts the definition of the relevant
property interest from state law considerations to the legitimacy of
government interests.158
The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, allows state law to control the choice of denominator and, therefore, in many situations,
resolution of the takings inquiry.159 Using only the state’s approach
to defining boundaries, however, would ignore the fact that lot or
boundary lines generally were drawn before development plans or
subdivisions were made. Those boundaries typically do not reflect the
suitability of the tract or lot for development. The lot lines were established under state law for the purpose of determining ownership, not
for the purpose of evaluating the development potential of the lot.
The mixing of substantive due process and takings analysis and
the evolution of regulatory takings from physical takings have led to
the untethering of a number of legal concepts that defined and limited
takings analysis. Those concepts involved notions of unjust enrichment, foreseeability, and windfalls that were tied to the in rem nature
of the Takings Clause, captured through the use of the term “property.” The next section discusses the evolutionary path from physical
to regulatory takings and the legal concepts that have gotten lost in
the translation.

154. Id. (discussing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)).
155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 545–48 (2005)). In Agins the Court
held there was no taking when a zoning ordinance limited, without completely eliminating,
development on the land. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262–63. In Lingle the Court narrowed Agins,
holding that the validity of a law under a substantially advances formula was a matter of
due process and did not address whether a compensable taking existed. Lingle, 544 U.S. at
548.
157. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950.
158. Id. at 1955–56.
159. Id. at 1954.
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III. THE ROAD FROM PHYSICAL TO
REGULATORY TAKINGS
Even before Mahon established a constitutional basis for declaring
as confiscatory laws that went too far in restricting economic use, the
courts had mixed the language of confiscation and takings with due
process deprivations. This mixed narrative is understandable when
considered in light of the early practice of handling federal takings
claims brought against states under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as part of the first principles of universal
law captured in that Clause.160 Early on, the Court construed the Due
Process Clause as including a compensation requirement, “founded in
natural equity,” for the taking of property.161 Claims of uncompensated
takings initially required a physical occupation or invasion to be
successful.162 As the degree of permanence, directness, and physicality
of the interference declined, courts would also consider the impact of
the government act on use value, the foreseeability of the impact, and
its substantiality.163 Ultimately, as the scope of government regulations grew, courts became concerned about the seemingly limitless
reach of government regulation over property and decided to recognize
the concept of a regulatory taking. The separation of the regulatory
takings concept from physical takings enabled courts to find a taking
when no government-induced physical occupation or appropriation
existed. The separation also allowed the courts to break from the
deferential substantive due process review accorded legislative acts
affecting property and impose more limits on government regulation
of property.
A. Police Power Regulation of
“Property Clothed with a Public Interest”
The Court’s oversight of economic regulation of property has gone
through a number of phases. When the young country needed more
settlement and westward expansion, land distribution laws played a
major role in promoting and regulating growth, agricultural production, and economic development.164 Government’s authority to promote
the public good—the public health, welfare, and safety—was broad.
160. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897); see
also Robert Brauneis, The Foundation of Our “Regulatory Takings” Jurisprudence: The Myth
and Meaning of Justice Holmes’s Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.
J. 613, 667–68 (1996).
161. Chi., Burlington & Quincy, 166 U.S. at 236.
162. See Butler, Governance Function, supra note 2, at 1689-90, 1721–23.
163. See id. at 1709–16, 1721–23.
164. See, e.g., LYNDA L. BUTLER & MARGIT LIVINGSTON, VIRGINIA TIDAL AND COASTAL
LAW ch. 8 (Michie Co. 1988) (discussing Virginia’s land distribution laws).
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The Court recognized that each citizen “necessarily parts with some
rights or privileges” in order to enable the government to adopt laws
to further the public good.165 Further, this power included regulation
of the manner in which owners used their property and could abate
harmful or noxious uses.166 But the Court recognized that there are
“limits beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go.”167 If a statute
had “no real or substantial relation” to the public health, welfare, or
safety or was “a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law,” then the statute had exceeded those limits.168 At the time, the
key constraints imposed on the states’ police power regulation of property were the Due Process and Contracts Clauses.169
This approach to police power regulation became problematic once
the Court broadened the scope of the police power through its property
“affected with a public interest” doctrine.170 Formulated in the 1876
decision Munn v. Illinois,171 the doctrine justified regulation of certain
165. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876); see also ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE
POWER § 16, at 12 (1904) (noting that sometimes individual interests must yield to the public
welfare).
166. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 658, 663–64 (1887); Munn, 94 U.S. at 125; see also
FREUND, supra note 165, §§ 511–517 (discussing the difference between valid police power
regulation and eminent domain). The 1887 decision Mugler v. Kansas reflects the early approach of the Supreme Court to police power regulation. In Mugler, the Court concluded that
government’s lawful exercise of its police power to prevent a public nuisance caused by private property was not subject to the just compensation principle even though the government
action destroyed or significantly diminished the value of the property. The power to prohibit
harmful uses was not subject to the condition that government pay just compensation for
pecuniary losses suffered by property owners because, according to the Court, property owners were not permitted to conduct a noxious use. In Mugler, the state legislature had enacted
a statute prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors except for medical,
scientific, and mechanical purposes. Prior to the adoption of the law, Mugler had built and
operated a brewery. Enforcement of the statutory prohibition meant a material diminution
in value of the property. When Mugler was arrested for violating the ban on the sale and
manufacture of intoxicating liquors and for maintaining a public nuisance, he challenged the
law on due process grounds, arguing that the law had in effect taken his property without
payment of just compensation by materially diminishing its value and thus had deprived
him of due process. In explaining why no constitutional violation had occurred, the Court
declared that a state’s police power included the power to prohibit uses injurious to the public. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 664–65, 668–69, 671.
167. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661.
168. Id.
169. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2016);
see also GEORGE SKOURAS, TAKINGS LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT: JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF
THE REGULATORY STATE’S ACQUISITION, USE, AND CONTROL OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 20–26
(1998).
170. See generally FREUND, supra note 165, §§ 372–401; William M. Treanor, Jam for
Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L .J. 813, 836 (1998). For a
discussion of the origins of the doctrine, see Harry N. Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent
Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, 5 PERSP. AM. HIST. 329 (1971).
For a different perspective, see CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE
OF THE TRACKS (1986) (exploring use of a common law duty to serve in addressing problems
of inequality in providing essential services to the public).
171. 94 U.S. 113, 113 (1876).
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property to protect the public interest. In Munn the Court upheld the
regulation of rates charged by grain elevator operators against a due
process challenge.172 The case involved a state law regulating elevators
or warehouses when grain was stored in bulk and the grain of different
owners was mixed or otherwise stored in a manner that made preservation of the separately owned lots impossible.173 Among other requirements, the law mandated that the owner, lessee, or manager of the
warehouse obtain a license to operate as a public warehouse, file a
bond, and charge no more than the maximum rate allowed by law.174
In analyzing the validity of the government’s regulation of privately
owned elevators and warehouses, the Court declared that an owner
who devotes his property to a use affecting the public is “in effect,
grant[ing] to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to
be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the
interest he has thus created.”175 The Court explained that property
becomes “clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to
make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large.”176
Businesses that have monopoly power over a product or use impacting
the public welfare would qualify as such property.177 The grain warehousemen fell into this category because of the immenseness of their
grain market, the absence of public grain warehouses, and the great
demand for grain.178 In the words of counsel quoted by the Court, the
warehousemen stood at the “gateway of commerce.”179
An important factor in Munn and other early property affected with
a public interest cases was the monopolistic character of the business.
In some of these cases, the monopoly arose from natural conditions. In
other cases, economic conditions tended to create the monopoly.180
Regardless of the origin, the monopolistic conditions meant that
“the common regulating factor, competition . . . [was] absent”181 and
therefore would not limit the profits of the business. Further, the
importance of the business to the public meant that the business
would be able to exploit its monopoly power in the absence of rate
172. Id. at 135–36.
173. See id. at 115–16.
174. See id. at 116–17.
175. Id. at 126.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 127–28. The Court ultimately decided that the existence of monopoly
power is not a necessary condition. See FREUND, supra note 165, §§ 376–377 (discussing the
role of the monopoly factor).
178. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 130.
179. Id. at 132 (quoting counsel) (internal quotation marks omitted); see HAAR &
FESSLER, supra note 170, at 146–47 (discussing Munn).
180. See FREUND, supra note 165, § 377, at 387–88.
181. Id. at 387.
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regulation.182 Although later cases clarified that monopoly power was
not a necessary condition, it still helped to identify situations where
the public could be subject to “exorbitant charges and arbitrary control.”183
The Supreme Court case law defining “property affected with a public interest” failed to provide a consistent or coherent definition.184
Among other problems, the case law did not identify a common, defining characteristic capable of explaining, in a predictable and principled
manner, when property was affected with a public interest.185 Some
justices preferred to limit the category of property affected with a
public interest to property that was dedicated by the owner to public
use or for which the government granted a special privilege or use.186
Others included a wide range of businesses within the category.187
Though the courts disagreed about the scope of property affected
with a public interest, courts generally agreed that rate regulation
of businesses affected with a public interest was allowed, even without
a showing of an actual threat posed by high rates, as long as the regulation did not deny a reasonable or fair rate of return.188
Perhaps the most comprehensive definition of property affected
with a public interest was announced by the Court in Charles Wolff
Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations.189 According to that
decision, three general classes of property affected with a public interest existed. One category included businesses “carried on under the
authority of a public grant of privileges” that expressly or impliedly
imposed an “affirmative duty” to perform a public service.190
Businesses falling within the first category were “created for public
purposes.”191 Examples included public utilities, railroads, and other
common carriers.192 A second category involved certain “exceptional”
businesses to which the public interest had attached.193 Inns, ferries,
182. See generally id. §§ 376–377, at 385–88 (discussing the monopoly factor).
183. Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 538 (1923);
see FREUND, supra note 165, § 376, at 386.
184. See HAAR & FESSLER, supra note 170, at 145–54 (discussing how the concept differed among courts and changed over time).
185. See FREUND, supra note 165, § 373, at 382; HAAR & FESSLER, supra note 170, at
145–51 (discussing “clothed with a public interest” as an “expanding conception of a public
utility”).
186. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 136, 139 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting).
187. See, e.g., Wolff Packing, 262 U.S. at 535–36.
188. See Treanor, supra note 170, at 838–39.
189. Wolff Packing, 262 U.S. at 535. See HAAR & FESSLER, supra note 170, at 153–54
(discussing Wolff Packing).
190. Wolff Packing, 262 U.S. at 535.
191. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 544 (1898).
192. Wolff Packing, 262 U.S. at 535.
193. Id.
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cabs, and grist mills seemed to fall within this category.194 The third
category involved businesses that were “not public at their inception”
but had “risen to be such” status because the owner had devoted
his business to the public use.195 Such a change in status required
“more than that the public welfare [was] affected by continuity or by
the price at which a commodity is sold or a service rendered.”196 Rather
the circumstances must indicate that “a peculiarly close relation”
existed between the public and the business—a relation that suggests
the existence of “an affirmative obligation . . . to be reasonable in dealing with the public.”197 The key characteristics of businesses in the
third category were “the indispensable nature of the service” and
the potential exploitation of a dependent public by exorbitant prices
and arbitrary control.198 Examples of businesses in the third category
included grain elevators,199 fire insurance,200 water works,201 and telegraph and telephone companies.202 Judicial use of the “property affected with a public interest” doctrine probably reached its peak under
Wolff Packing.
B. The Rise of Substantive Due Process Constraints and
Development of Takings Theories
The property affected with a public interest doctrine lost its dominance in the 1890s as jurists and commentators concerned about the
breadth of the holding in Munn and of police power regulation more
generally searched for theories to limit the reach of the police power.203
One result of this search was the transformation of the due process
principle into substantive protection of property.204 For a time the
Due Process Clause became a powerful substantive check on economic
regulation of property.205 Another result was the application of a just
compensation principle, based on Fourteenth Amendment due process
194. See id.; Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U.S. 252, 255 (1916).
195. Wolff Packing, 262 U.S. at 535.
196. Id. at 536.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 538.
199. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 114 (1876).
200. German All. Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 405–15 (1914).
201. See Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 348 (1884).
202. See Hockett v. State, 5 N.E. 178, 182 (Ind. 1886).
203. See Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry Co. v. Minn., 134 U.S. 418, 456–57 (1890) (holding that the railroad was deprived of its property without due process when the railroad
commission set prices that were not subject to judicial review); SKOURAS, supra note 169, at
26.
204. See Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry Co., 134 U.S. at 456–57; SKOURAS, supra note
169, at 26.
205. See SKOURAS, supra note 169, at 129 n.52; ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISES
AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BENCH AND BAR 1887–1895, at 2 (1960).
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analysis, to limit the regulation of property affected with a public
interest. In its 1898 decision Smyth v. Ames, the Court clarified that
the regulation of rates charged by a business affected with a public
interest must allow a fair or reasonable rate of return.206 A rate regulation that denied a fair return would deprive the property owner of
due process and equal protection of the law contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment and therefore require payment of just compensation.207
Smyth thus imposed some limits on the property affected with a public
interest doctrine, providing a fair or reasonable return test for distinguishing between legitimate and confiscatory rate regulations.208
Reaction to Munn’s broad approach to interpreting property
affected with a public interest helped to set the stage for the development of the regulatory takings doctrine.209 As discontent with government regulation of property grew, the influence of jurists and commentators supporting stronger protection of contract and property rights
increased.210 The emergence of substantive due process provided some
fairly immediate but relatively short-lived relief from government
regulation of property.211 By the late 1930s, substantive protection of
property under the due process clause had run its course.212 The fair or
reasonable return limitation on police power regulation of property
affected with a public interest proved more durable. It provided a
foundation for the regulatory takings doctrine, establishing that
deprivation of a fair return on property affected with a public interest
could, by itself, be a constitutional violation requiring just compensation. Expansion of this principle beyond the context of property
affected with a public interest required, however, that the courts
overcome the conceptual constraints of traditional takings law. Those
constraints, which arose from the early focus on physical takings,
concerned how the courts defined not only the scope of takings liability
but also the types of recoverable damages through the consequential
loss doctrine.
206. See 169 U.S. 466, 546–47 (1898). But see Fed. Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas Pipeline
Co., 315 U.S. 575, 599, 601–06 (1942) (Black, J., concurring) (explaining the havoc caused by
the Smyth decision and how the Court has subsequently limited Smyth to clarify the difference between the power of eminent domain and rate regulation).
207. See Smyth, 169 U.S. at 525–27, 546; Treanor, supra note 170, at 837–38.
208. See Treanor, supra note 170, at 837–38; Patrick C. McGinley, Regulatory “Takings”:
The Remarkable Resurrection of Economic Substantive Due Process Analysis in Constitutional Law, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 10369 (Sept. 1987), reprinted in 1988 ZONING AND PLANNING
LAW HANDBOOK 337, 344, 352 (1988).
209. See Treanor, supra note 170, at 836–39, 861–71 (discussing the transition from
property affected with a public interest to a takings revival).
210. See HAAR & FESSLER, supra note 170, at 152.
211. See JAN G. LAITOS, LAW OF PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION: LIMITATIONS ON
GOVERNMENTAL POWERS § 2.03 (3d ed. 2019).
212. See DAVID A. SCHULTZ, PROPERTY, POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 50–54
(1992).

2020]

MURR AND REGULATORY TAKINGS

127

Until the regulatory takings concept emerged, property owners
seeking just compensation under the Takings Clause had to establish
an actual physical invasion, occupation, or appropriation of property
directly caused by government.213 Even when a court occasionally
voiced concerns about the economic impact of regulatory interference,
the courts generally refused to find a taking based on regulatory
interference alone as long as substantial enjoyment or profitable use
remained.214 The courts stressed that diminution in value or pecuniary
loss resulting solely from regulatory interference was incidental to the
proper exercise of government power and therefore not recoverable
under the Takings Clause.215 Lawful police power action thus could not
result in a taking absent a physical invasion or direct appropriation of
a property interest.
A core part of the Court’s justification for denying compensation for
diminution in value resulting from regulatory interference was the
common law consequential damages or loss doctrine.216 Based on the
distinction between general and consequential damages, this doctrine
varies in meaning and scope according to the legal context. The basic
idea of the doctrine is that recovery of damages generally is limited to
injury that arises naturally as a direct result of wrongful action.217
Consequential or special damage instead refers to loss that occurs
more indirectly as a consequence of injury to plaintiff’s property or
asset.218 Consequential damage can include lost profits or income,
out-of-pocket expenses incurred to deal with the loss of the property,
diminution in value of the remaining property caused by the use
of adjacent property, and emotional distress and other personal,
nonmonetary losses resulting from the tort, breach of contract, or
taking.219 General damage, in contrast, measures the diminution in
the owner’s net worth caused by the loss of the actual asset.220 In a
takings situation, government must pay just compensation for the
value of the taken property typically measured as the difference
213. Butler, Governance Function, supra note 2, at 1689–90, 1721–23.
214. See supra notes 23–38 and accompanying text.
215. See Transp. Co. v. Chi., 99 U.S. 635, 637 (1878); Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 551 (1870);
FREUND, supra note 165, § 509, at 544; MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 71–73 (1992).
216. See United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377–78 (1946); FREUND, supra
note 165, § 509.
217. See ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1011 (1964 & Supp. 1999); 1
THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES §§ 111–13 (8th ed. 1891).
218. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.2, at 289, § 3.3(1), at 293 (2d ed. 1993)
[hereinafter DOBBS, REMEDIES].
219. See generally id. § 3.3 (1), (4), § 5.15(1); LAITOS, supra note 211, § 18.03[D].
220. In contracts and torts actions, courts measure general damages as the difference
between the market value of the property before and after the tort or breach as of a particular
time. See DOBBS, REMEDIES, supra note 218, § 3.3(3), (4).
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between the fair market value of the entire property before the taking
and the remaining portion after the taking.221 The differences between
general and consequential damages thus center on what is being
compensated. General damages compensate for the loss of or injury to
the actual asset, while consequential damages involve losses occurring
because the injured asset can no longer produce income or avoid
losses.222
In the physical takings context, consequential loss arises when a
property owner incurs damage in addition to the actual loss of the
property resulting from the forced transfer or physical invasion of the
property by government. As a general matter, the Supreme Court has
strictly adhered to the consequential loss doctrine in physical takings
cases, denying just compensation for damages not directly related to
the property that is taken.223 Just compensation cases have invoked
the doctrine on two levels: first, in defining the scope of takings liability and, second, in measuring just compensation.224 In the Legal
Tender Cases, the Court explained the role of the doctrine in defining
the scope of the Takings Clause, noting that the Clause “has always
been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation, and not to
consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power.”225
The Clause “has never been supposed to have any bearing upon, or to
inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to individuals.”226
As examples, the Court pointed to a “new tariff, an embargo, a draft,
or a war [which] may inevitably bring upon individuals great losses;
may, indeed, render valuable property almost valueless;”227 yet surely
no one expected that these exercises of lawful power would be barred
or inhibited by the Takings Clause.228 More than one hundred years
later, the Supreme Court commented on the role of the doctrine in
measuring just compensation. The Court noted that just compensation
normally is measured by the fair market value of the appropriated
property and that fair market value does not include consequential
damages.229
221. See LAITOS supra note 211, § 18.03[C], at 18–22 to 18–24.
222. See DOBBS, REMEDIES, supra note 218, § 3.3(4), at 304.
223. See United States. v. Fifty Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 33 (1984); United States v.
Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 378 (1946); Transp. Co. v. Chi., 99 U.S. 635, 641–42 (1878);
2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.08[2] (rev’d 3d ed. 2000). See generally JACQUES B.
GELIN & DAVID W. MILLER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.4(B) (1982); LAITOS,
supra note 211, § 17.03 (discussing general principles and issues relating to the calculation
of just compensation).
224. See generally SEDGWICK, supra note 217, § 114.
225. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 551 (1870).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See id.
229. See United States. v. Fifty Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 33 (1984).
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The origin of the consequential loss doctrine is far from clear.
Morton Horwitz, in his influential work The Transformation of
American Law, 1780–1860, attributed the initial development of the
doctrine to “the need to reduce the burden of damage judgments and
to make economic planning more coherent.”230 He explained that the
courts began by “redefin[ing] the scope of legal injury”231 to exclude
certain injuries because they either were trivial or already included
in the compensation paid.232 Further, regardless of the legal context,
courts traditionally have been suspicious of consequential loss
claims. Early on, American courts accepted the principles set forth
in Hadley v. Baxendale233 in defining recoverable breach of contract
damages.234 Those principles include the notion that the injured party
may recover for all general damages “as may fairly and reasonably be
considered . . . arising naturally . . . according to the usual course of
things” from the breach of contract.235 Although Hadley also allowed
recovery of special or consequential damage, such recovery could only
occur when it could “reasonably be supposed to have been in the
contemplation of both parties . . . as the probable result of the breach”
and the damage was reasonably certain.236 In tort actions the courts
similarly restricted recovery of special damages to those that proximately resulted from the wrongdoer’s act. Those damages that fail the
proximity test were viewed as too remote to be recoverable.237
In the common law and constitutional property contexts, traditional
courts took an even stronger position. The courts precluded, for
example, recovery for indirect injuries to land resulting from action
taken on neighboring land when the actor committed no trespass or
physical invasion. As early as 1815, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court announced that a landowner who “does what he has a right
to do upon his own land, without trespassing upon any law, custom,

230. HORWITZ, supra note 215, at 71.
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., Steele v. W. Inland Lock Navigation Co., 2 Johns. 283, 286 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1807) (holding that there is no recovery for damages that must have been taken into consideration in awarding just compensation for the taking); Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307,
314 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (holding that there is no recovery for “trifling inconvenience or damage to others”).
233. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
234. The Uniform Commercial Code continues this approach in section 1–305. It provides
that “neither consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except as specifically
provided in [this Act] or by other rule of law.” U.C.C. § 1–305; see also 2 DOBBS, REMEDIES,
supra note 218, § 12.17(1).
235. Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151; see also JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 547 (1998).
236. 156 Eng. Rep. at 151; see also CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 235, at 547, 553.
237. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 379, at 1056 (2000) [hereinafter DOBBS,
TORTS]; SEDGWICK, supra note 217, §§ 113, 142–143.
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title, or possession,” is not liable for “injurious consequences,”238 “only
for the natural and necessary consequences of his acti[ons].”239 The
Massachusetts court explained that a landowner “ought to foresee
the probable use” of the adjoining lands240 and “to have taken better
care” of his property.241 By the early 1820s, state courts already were
distinguishing between direct and consequential injuries in resolving
takings claims.242 As economic activity increased in frequency and
scope, judicial protection of businesses from liability for indirect
injuries began to impact resolution of takings claims in federal courts.
Eventually, courts used the consequential loss doctrine to justify
liability exemptions in both the takings and the common law property
contexts.243 Just as consequential injuries resulting from the exercise
of a lawful private right were not part of the risk assumed by the right
holder and were therefore not recoverable, consequential losses resulting from the exercise of lawful government action normally were not
compensable.244
The courts have offered a number of justifications for exempting
consequential losses from the government’s takings liability. In one of
the early state cases,245 the Massachusetts Supreme Court suggested
several possible rationales: foreseeability, unjust enrichment, and a
concern for windfalls.246 As the court explained, landowners should
take into account the risk of consequential injury when they agree
to a purchase price, especially when their land adjoins a public good
like a road.247 As voluntary purchasers, landowners could choose either
to “indemnify themselves in the price” or to take the risk of future
improvements and injury.248 Landowners are “presumed to foresee the
changes which public necessity [and] convenience may require,” and
to “avoid or provide against a loss”249 Property owners who suffer
consequential injuries should have known about the possibility of
future development and “guarded against a future loss.”250
238. Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 220, 226–27 (1815); accord Panton v. Holland, 17
Johns. 92, 99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812) (holding that a landowner is not liable for consequential
damages caused to adjoining land absent negligence or maliciousness).
239. Thurston, 12 Mass. at 229.
240. Id. at 226.
241. Id. at 229.
242. See, e.g., Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418 (1823).
243. See supra notes 170–76 and accompanying text.
244. See generally SEDGWICK, supra note 217, §§ 110–69 (discussing consequential damages).
245. See Callender, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418.
246. See id. at 431–32; see also Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 220, 225, 228 (1815).
247. See Callender, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) at 431.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 432.
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Compensation for consequential injuries thus could unjustly enrich
landowners. Other courts have offered similar explanations. In a 1984
decision, for example, the United States Supreme Court expressed the
fear that compensation for consequential damages would result in a
windfall if the damages were not used to rebuild or reacquire the lost
asset.251 In deciding not to award compensation for harm from development projects on adjacent property, the Court noted that the owner
of the damaged property should have foreseen the future development.252
Other justifications for excluding consequential losses from compensation awards exist. A New York state court, for instance, relied on
the importance of the public interest to justify the doctrine. In Lansing
v. Smith, the court explained that “every great public improvement
must, almost of necessity, more or less affect individual convenience
and property; and where the injury sustained is remote and consequential, it is . . . to be borne as a part of the price to be paid for the
advantages of the social condition.”253 Important public improvements
would not take place if government had to compensate property
owners for indirect or consequential losses.254 Additionally, courts have
noted that consequential damages are too uncertain and subjective
to be awarded.255 Focusing only on fair market value provides an
objective way to measure just compensation: transferable value has
built-in external validity checks.256 The textual language of the Just
Compensation Clause also provides justification. As the Court explained in a 1946 decision, the Fifth Amendment compensates for
the “value of the interest taken. . . . [Therefore] evidence of loss of
profits, damage to good will, the expense of relocation and other such
consequential losses are refused in federal condemnation proceedings.”257 Because of the Clause’s reference to the property taken, courts
have stressed the in rem nature of the just compensation principle,
noting that the Clause protects the taking of property and not the

251. See United States v. Fifty Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 34–35 (1984).
252. See Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368 (1924); see also GELIN & MILLER, supra
note 223, § 2.4, at 71–72.
253. 8 Cow. 146, 149 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828).
254. See generally THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 476
(5th ed. 1998); 2A NICHOLS, supra note 223, § 6.08[2], at 6–131 to -132.
255. See United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377–78 (1946); see also GELIN
& MILLER, supra note 223, § 2.4, at 84–85.
256. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949).
257. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. at 377–78.
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personal interests of the owner.258 In its 1893 decision Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States, the Court explained the in rem nature
of takings protection:
And this just compensation, it will be noticed, is for the property,
and not to the owner. Every other clause in this Fifth Amendment
is personal. . . . Instead of continuing that form of statement . . . the
personal element is left out, and the “just compensation” is to be a
full equivalent of the property taken.259

Whether a type of consequential loss is recoverable thus depends in
part on the legal context of the case. While the courts in tort and
breach of contract actions might compensate for consequential damage
that meets the foreseeability or proximate cause tests, courts in takings actions traditionally did not allow recovery of consequential
losses.260 The courts regularly have rejected takings claims for diminution in value of remaining land when the diminution in value is caused
by the use of adjacent land.261 The courts also do not allow recovery of
lost profits in takings actions, reasoning that the government did not
actually take the business producing the income.262 Nor do the courts
258. The precise meaning of the consequential loss concept has varied according to the
legal and factual context and according to the type of consequential injury involved in a case.
Consequential loss cases typically involve one of three key legal contexts: breach of contract,
torts, and takings. In a breach of contract action, courts allow recovery of consequential damage that should have been foreseeable or reasonably anticipated by the parties as a probable
result of the breach and that can be established with reasonable certainty as resulting from
the defendant’s breach. DOBBS, REMEDIES, supra note 218, § 12.4(4)–(7); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.14, at 912 (2d ed. 1990). In a tort action, a plaintiff must
establish that the consequential damage was the proximate and natural result of the wrongdoer’s act or failure to act. See DOBBS, REMEDIES, supra note 218, § 3.4; SEDGWICK, supra
note 217, §§ 110–13, 142–43. If consequential damages are so unusual or unforeseeable that
no one could have reasonably anticipated them, they are not recoverable. See DOBBS, TORTS,
supra note 237, § 379, at 1056; SEDGWICK, supra note 217, § 142, at 201. Finally, in takings
actions courts generally conclude that “non-physical damage . . . suffered by a property which
is neither invaded nor appropriated” is nonrecoverable consequential damage. NICHOLS, supra note 223, § 6.08[2], at 6–121. Different types of consequential loss include the diminution
in value of the remaining portion of the owner’s property caused by use of adjacent land, loss
of profits or business opportunities, additional expenses incurred to deal with the aftermath
of the breach, tort, or taking, and personal, nonmonetary injuries indirectly resulting from
the wrong. See GELIN & MILLER, supra note 223, § 2.4.
259. 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893); see also GELIN & MILLER, supra note 223, § 2.4, at 79.
260. See Monongahela Navigation, 148 U.S. at 326; DOBBS, REMEDIES, supra note 218,
§ 3.4, at 318; GELIN & MILLER, supra note 223 at 78–79; LAITOS, supra note 211, § 18.03[D].
261. In Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368, 372 (1924), for example, the Court held
that the owner of land taken for the construction of a nitrate plant was not entitled to compensation for diminution in value of the portion of the owner’s land not taken because the
diminution was caused by the acquisition and use of adjacent lands owned by others for the
same project.
262. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 345 (1925); Omnia Co. v. United
States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923). Voters in some states have approved state constitutional provisions that expand the measure of just compensation to include some consequential losses.
See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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allow recovery of out-of-pocket expenses incurred to deal with the loss
of the taken property.263 According to one scholar, the courts reason
that such expenses would not be recoverable in actions involving
voluntary sales and therefore should not be compensable in takings
situations.264 Finally, courts generally do not award compensation for
emotional distress and other personal, nonmonetary damages relating
to the taking. Otherwise government would be discouraged from
taking any land for beneficial purposes.265
Eventually, as physical takings analysis brought in regulatory aspects, the courts introduced several theories and principles of liability
that would become important to modern takings analysis. One theory
involved an extension of the functional equivalence concept seen in
some traditional physical takings cases. As Justice Holmes explained
in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, depriving regulated property of commercially viable use “has very nearly the same effect for constitutional
purposes as appropriating or destroying it.”266 Another theory advanced in Mahon focused on the limited public interest furthered by
the statute. Though Justice Holmes admitted that “there is a public
interest even in this” case of the purchase of a single private house, he
stressed that the public interest in ordinary private affairs usually
does not warrant much government interference.267 In Mahon, the
harm to the private house was “not common or public.”268 Nor did it
raise a public safety issue; notice of the impeding subsidence had been
given to the surface property owner.269 Under Holmesian analysis, the
public interest thus was relegated to a threshold inquiry into the basic
legitimacy of the legislative act but was not relevant to evaluating the
economic impact of the act on the property owner. A third theory involved the concept of average reciprocity of advantage. As Justice
Holmes explained, the statute did not secure the “average reciprocity
of advantage” needed to justify police power regulation of property.270
According to the majority opinion, the regulated property owner in Mahon did not receive benefits as well as burdens from the act.271 A
263. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 338–39 (1893).
264. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 55 (1985).
265. See LAITOS, supra note 211, § 18.03[D].
266. 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
267. Id. at 413.
268. Id.
269. See id. at 414.
270. Id. at 415–16.
271. See id. at 414–15. But see id. at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (declaring that reciprocity of advantage is not a consideration when the purpose of police power regulation is to
prevent public harm from private land use). Some have interpreted the average reciprocity
of advantage test narrowly to require tangible benefits for the regulated property owner.
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“strong public desire to improve the public condition” was not enough,
in Justice Holmes’s opinion, to justify taking property without payment of just compensation when no average reciprocity of advantage
existed.272 A fourth justification for the decision was assumption of
risk. Holmes explained that when parties voluntarily “take the risk of
acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see that the fact that their
risk has become a danger warrants . . . giving . . . them greater rights
than they bought.”273
The Court in Mahon thus announced several key principles that
now form the foundation of regulatory takings jurisprudence. The
Court clarified that a property owner has a constitutionally protected
right to conduct an economically viable use and therefore the government could not deprive a property owner of all commercially viable use
without payment of just compensation. This idea is implicit in Justice
Holmes’s statement that a law that made the mining of certain coal
commercially impracticable was functionally equivalent “for constitutional purposes . . . [to] appropriating or destroying” the regulated
property.274 Justice Holmes also subtly introduced a quantitative test
for resolving regulatory takings claims through his reliance on diminution in value. 275 Instead of following the traditional approach of focusing on whether a physical invasion or direct appropriation existed,
Justice Holmes looked at the quantity or degree of interference with
the property.276 His approach allowed courts to consider the severity
of the impact of the regulation on the property’s value when no permanent physical invasion or appropriation existed.
In addition to bringing regulatory action within the scope of the
Takings Clause, Holmes’s more pragmatic approach shifted the focus
of the takings inquiry from clear benchmarks like direct physical
invasions to utilitarian considerations, defined in part by the “daily
experience[] of people.”277 This approach eventually allowed the Court
to address the problem of unfairness resulting from the combined
effect of the traditional approach’s refusal to award compensation
unless a physical invasion existed and its refusal to allow recovery for
consequential loss. Under Holmes’s solution to the problem of
Others have read the principle more broadly to include benefits to the community as a whole
or to the landowner over time. See, e.g., id. at 419, 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (explaining
that the value of the mine should be viewed as a whole); see SKOURAS, supra note 169, at 32;
see also Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 744, 803 (1999)
(describing reciprocity of advantage as a theory of social responsibility involving offsetting
benefits).
272. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 414.
275. Accord SKOURAS, supra note 169, at 31.
276. See supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text.
277. SKOURAS, supra note 169, at 29, 31–32.
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unfairness, serious regulatory interference became functionally equivalent to a physical taking. By freeing regulatory interference claims
from the requirement of a physical invasion, the Court allowed
recovery of general damages even when no physical invasion existed.278
Neither private rights nor public interests were absolute. Instead,
Justice Holmes preferred a functionalist approach over a formalistic
approach, fact- and context-based analysis over categorical reasoning,
balancing over precise line drawing, and a pragmatic, relativist
approach over an absolutist approach.279 Although earlier cases had
discussed the importance of economically viable use and generally had
observed that government action could not deprive property owners of
all such use, Mahon actually gave life to the idea—allowing it to stand
on its own without a physical invasion. Much of the source of that life
came from Justice Holmes’s willingness to subordinate the public
interest when the economic impact of government regulation was
great. Over time the ultimate effect of Justice Holmes’s paradigm shift
was the development of a doctrine that limits government’s ability to
regulate property under the Takings Clause.
The evolution of regulatory takings thus reflects some important
conceptual and theoretical connections to physical takings. Those ties
are captured through the functional equivalence logic and include the
in rem basis of takings liability, unjust enrichment and the concern for
windfalls, the importance of the public interest and promotion of the
public good, and limitations on liability imposed through foreseeability
and the consequential damage doctrine. Over time, as the regulatory
takings doctrine has taken on a life of its own, the defining theories
and concepts have become unmoored. Without an adequate connection
to its own history, it is no wonder that modern regulatory takings analysis is riddled with inconsistencies, perplexing results, and the continued mixing of due process and takings analysis. It is no wonder that
the regulatory takings doctrine has lost sight of its inherent limits.
IV. THE INHERENT LIMITS OF
REGULATORY TAKINGS
Because of the lost connection between regulatory takings and its
defining concepts, modern regulatory takings decisions have produced
unexpected and confusing results. New forms of takings, for example,
have emerged that circle back to the earlier substantive due process
analysis of confiscatory practices. Nexus reviews conducted in evaluating regulatory takings challenges have demanded an “essential
nexus” between a legitimate state interest and a government condition
278. For an in-depth discussion of how Mahon came to be viewed as a regulatory takings
case, see Treanor, supra note 170, at 861–71.
279. See id. at 854-55, 860–61.
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imposed on a property owner, as well as “rough proportionality”
between the condition and the projected impact of the proposed use.280
That the Court announced the nexus reviews in cases involving
required transfers of easements to the public suggests that the circling
back was intentional.281 The Court could have simply found a physical
taking but chose to say more. When the Court in Koontz v. St. Johns
River Water Management District extended the nexus review, as a
guiding principle, to situations involving permit denials, the right to
just compensation was protected even in the absence of an actual taking.282 The Court in Koontz explained that the essential nexus and
rough proportionality tests applied regardless of whether government
approves the permit or instead denies it after the applicant refused to
meet the condition.283 Otherwise government could evade these limitations on its regulatory powers “by phrasing its demands for property
as conditions precedent to permit approval.” 284 As the Court explained,
the absence of an actual taking misses the point. “Extortionate
demands for property in the land-use permitting context run afoul of
the Takings Clause not because they take property but because they
impermissibly burden the right not to have property taken without
just compensation.”285 However, because the permit was denied after
the unconstitutional condition was refused, no actual taking occurred,
and therefore the Fifth Amendment’s remedy of just compensation
could not apply.286
The decision in Koontz is confusing and perplexing. How could
the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation be violated when no
compensation could be paid under the federal Constitution because of
the absence of an actual taking? Is a constitutional right without a
constitutional remedy really a right? The decision also sends mixed
messages about the role of substantive due process analysis in the land
use regulatory context. Without conducting any nexus review of its
own, the Koontz Court extended the takings nexus review tests to
monetary exactions in spite of the Court’s earlier decisions in Eastern
Enterprises v. Apfel287 and Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.288 In Eastern Enterprises a majority of justices agreed that a government-imposed
280. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386, 391 (1994).
281. See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 396 (requiring the dedication of a public greenway);
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (requiring a public easement to walk
along the beach).
282. 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2602–03 (2013).
283. Id. at 2595.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 2589–90.
286. Id. at 2597.
287. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
288. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
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obligation to pay money could not provide the basis for a taking when
it "does not operate upon or alter an identified property interest."289
In Lingle the Court stated that a means/ends nexus review normally
belonged under the Due Process Clause and that the substantially
advance means/end review was “not a valid method of identifying
regulatory takings for which the Fifth Amendment requires just compensation.”290 As the Court in Lingle explained, the means/end review
“probes the regulation’s underlying validity” and “reveals nothing
about the magnitude or character of the burden a regulation imposes
upon private property rights. Nor does it provide any information
about how any regulatory burden is distributed.”291 The review thus
“does not help to identify those regulations whose effects are functionally comparable to government appropriation or invasion of private
property.”292
Then, in the 2015 Horne v. Department of Agriculture decision, the
Court applied physical takings analysis to a regulatory setting.293 In
Horne the Court concluded that a physical taking occurred because an
agricultural law required raisin growers to reserve a percentage of
their crop for their regulatory body to manage and control in years
when market conditions necessitated government intervention to
stabilize the raisin market.294 The Court explained that the law effectuated both a physical surrender and a transfer of title.295 The reserve
requirement thus deprived the growers of their “entire ‘bundle’ of
property rights . . . ‘the rights to possess, use and dispose of’” the
reserved raisins.296 It did not matter whether economically viable use
remained,297 nor whether participation in the regulated market was
voluntary.298 That the raisin growers were in a protected market,
receiving windfalls under the government program, was irrelevant to
determining whether a physical taking existed.299 The Court refused
to consider any windfall received by the grower for the sale of the crop
not subject to the reservation requirement under its physical takings
analysis—not even if the price far exceeded what it would have been
289. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 540 (opinion concurring in judgment and dissenting in part); see
id. at 554–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The ‘private property' upon which the [Takings]
Clause traditionally has focused is a specific interest in physical or intellectual property").
290. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545.
291. Id. at 542–43.
292. Id. at 542.
293. 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
294. Id. at 2428.
295. Id.
296. Id. (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435
(1982)).
297. Id. at 2429.
298. Id. at 2430–31.
299. See id. at 2429–32.
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without regulation—because “the value of the interest [in the reserved
raisins] depends on the discretion of the taker.”300 Nor did the fungible
nature of the property matter in considering whether the property was
physically taken. Each raisin apparently counted in Horne. The government’s requirement of physically setting aside a certain percentage
of raisins constituted a physical taking even though actual separation
was the only way to keep track of different batches of fungible property
and even though the only economically viable use of tangible, fungible,
perishable property was a timely sale.301 Nor did the Court view the
relationship between growers and their regulatory body more like a
trust arrangement, with enough of a legal interest being transferred
to the regulatory body to enable the trustee to fulfill the purpose of the
trust to stabilize the raisin market.
The role of the consequential damages doctrine in physical takings
analysis also has been overlooked. The doctrine highlights the relevance of foreseeability, a concern for unjust enrichment and windfalls,
and the in rem nature of takings protection. Courts feared that
property owners would receive windfalls if consequential damages
were awarded, defeating the public interest in important public works
and public improvement projects.302 Even when a condemnation or
physical taking has occurred, diminution in value is not generally
recoverable as long as substantial enjoyment and use remain.303 This
tolerance for some adverse economic impact in the interest of promoting important public interests is slowly being eroded through the
adoption of per se rules (where consideration of the public interest
is not even allowed), the strengthening of the takings nexus review
(requiring greater precision than normally required under substantive
due process in the land use regulatory setting), and the expansion of
physical takings analysis in regulatory settings (circumventing the
inability of property owners to recover for partial regulatory takings).
This erosion ignores the in rem nature of protection under the Takings
Clause—which became part of regulatory takings through the logic of
functional equivalence used to recognize regulatory takings. That in
rem nature limits just compensation to the actual property taken and
does not include related but personal interests of the owner.
Regulatory takings differ from physical takings in some ways that,
if ignored, would expand protection from regulation to the point where
the public good would suffer. The eminent domain clause was ratified
300. Id. at 2429.
301. Lynda L. Butler, The Horne Dilemma: Protecting Property’s Richness and Frontiers,
75 MD. L. REV. 787, 799–800 (2016). For further discussion of the Horne decision, compare
id. with Mark Kelman, Untangling Horne; Resuscitating Nollan, 104 CORNELL L. REV.
ONLINE 50 (2018).
302. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
303. See Trans. Co. v. Chi., 99 U.S. 635 (1878).
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at a time when the nation’s resources, conditions, and public needs
were much different than today’s. The economy was still developing
and many threats to survival existed. State governments used land
distribution laws to promote economic development, settlement and
westward expansion, agricultural production, military service, and
many other core needs.304 Those conditions have changed—so much so
that the public good now requires regulatory policies that address the
costs of relentless land development and resource use. Allowing the
scope of regulatory takings to expand without consideration of the logic
and nature of takings protection would undermine the public good. The
logic of function equivalence provides a compelling reason for recognizing regulatory takings, for economic regulation can ruin the value of
a person’s property. Yet government must be able to regulate land
use to promote important public health, welfare, and safety interests
in response to changing social and natural conditions. Under our
social contract, property owners have long accepted some diminution
in value, some interference with economic expectations, and some
inconvenience.
The differences between regulatory and physical takings attest to
why the regulatory takings doctrine must remain limited in scope.
Those differences arise because the functional equivalence logic first
used to extend takings protection to regulatory settings does not fit
perfectly. Without an appreciation for that logical context, regulatory
takings analysis becomes unmoored from its history—a history that
helps to keep the analysis grounded and the implications of the differences in check. In contrast to physical takings, regulatory takings settings generally do not involve an affirmative use but rather promotion
of a legitimate public purpose through limitations on use.305 Once
courts were willing to find a regulatory taking from a legal restriction
without worrying about public use, it was only a matter of time before
the meaning of public use became synonymous with public purpose.306
A regulatory taking also requires substantial or total interference with
a property right.307 Inconvenience or minor interference is not enough
to find a regulatory taking because otherwise government could not
improve the public condition. Even a minor but permanent physical
invasion, however, is a per se physical taking no matter how important
the public interest. When that minor physical taking becomes part
of a complex regulatory program developed to protect the property
owners’ agricultural business (for example, the raisin market),
304. See BUTLER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 164, ch. 8 (discussing the roles of Virginia’s
land distribution laws).
305. See LAITOS, supra note 211, § 13.04[A][1].
306. See Haw. Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) (“The ‘public use’
requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers.”).
307. See LAITOS, supra note 211, §§ 12.02, 12.06.
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minor economic impact suddenly becomes compensable through
the physical taking concept. Eventually, the logic underlying the
regulatory takings doctrine is overlooked or misunderstood, and the
doctrine takes on a life of its own.
The denominator problem provides a powerful example of the
confusion that can result from continuing expansion of the regulatory
takings doctrine. The choice of denominator could be used to further
expand the doctrine well beyond its defining concepts. If the denominator is only the affected property, any regulation preventing use of a
portion of the property owner’s rights would effect a regulatory taking,
and important police power action could become too costly to pursue.
Yet no property owner has a reasonable expectation of receiving maximum profits from each part or from the whole. The moral outrage over
losing the right to mine support columns when subsidence would harm
public goods or another’s surface property should not be that great if
the coal already mined produced sizable returns. The outrage over losing the right to sell the reserved raisins in the primary market surely
would not compare to the pain of losing the value of an entire crop in
an unprotected market that has far too many raisins. Receiving less
than full value for each reserved raisin would produce a partial economic loss and could effect a taking unless the entire regulatory context is considered: the subsidized market existing for the growers as
well as the public, the reasonable return received on the remaining
crop, the voluntary participation in the market, and the economic
value of the grower’s whole crop. By choosing to protect the grower
against the possibility of a glutted market, government should not find
itself liable for controlling the supply of a perishable, fungible crop
grown only for sale in that protected market.
Courts applying the regulatory takings doctrine thus need to recognize the doctrine’s inherent limits. Ignoring those limits has led to
much confusion and inconsistency in takings jurisprudence. Courts
handling regulatory takings claims involving land need to think
objectively and comprehensively about the property, considering how
the regulated or proposed use adversely affects the land’s connection
to the surrounding ecosystem and community. Well-tailored laws that
address adverse impacts generally should not pose a regulatory taking
even if the regulations cause diminution in value, lower profits, or
more restricted use. Laws governing property rights should not be
locked in time in the sense of dealing with changing conditions and
knowledge about adverse impacts. Nor should the legal system ignore
the relationship between the whole and its parts—both in the physical
and economic sense—simply because of how a lot line is drawn or a
temporal space is defined. The whole never should be treated as less
than the sum of the parts. If, for example, the interaction of the parts
is being ignored in ways that threaten or undermine the whole, the
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part should not serve as the benchmark for determining whether a
law addressing that threat results in a total loss of economically viable
use. Otherwise the property owner could unjustly receive windfalls at
the expense of the whole. Similarly, in defining the economic whole,
courts should ask whether contiguous parcels under common ownership form an integrated economic unit.308 An important inquiry in conducting this analysis would be whether a legal principle being
applied to define a tract’s boundaries or dimensions has independent
legal significance outside of the takings context.309 In Murr, for example, the merger doctrine had routinely been applied in land use law to
contiguous, non-conforming lots under common ownership.310
Another idea would be to borrow Justice Kagan’s idea of using a
risk calculus for determining when a heightened review or per se
approach is in order for regulatory takings analysis. Justice Kagan
raised the idea in her opinion in Reed v. Town of Gilbert—a free speech
case involving a sign ordinance.311 She objected to the “high bar” set by
the content-based approach of the majority, which would impose the
strict scrutiny standard on virtually all sign ordinances because they
regulate according to specific types of subject matter.312 Even historic
signs, street addresses, speed limits, and other information-conveying
signs would need to meet the stringent test.313 Justice Kagan instead
would apply “strict scrutiny to facially content-based regulations of
speech” when “there is any ‘realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas [the rationale for the strict scrutiny test] is afoot.’ ”314 In
the regulatory takings context, the key question would be to ask
whether there is a realistic possibility that a regulation is functionally
equivalent to a physical taking—raising the same types of risks and
dangers posed by physical takings and speaking to the core purposes
of the eminent domain clause. These core dangers include the risk
of majoritarian exploitation or manipulation of property (for example,
to lower the value of the property before condemnation), the risk of
favoritism (indicating the absence of reciprocity of advantage or any
308. See LAITOS, supra note 211, § 18.03[D].
309. See Stuart Banner, Murr and Merger, 7 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 185,
186, 190–98 (2018).
310. See id. at 186, 190–98 (explaining this practice). The doctrine also has routinely
been applied under the common law of property to clean up title when an owner acquires, at
separate points in time, what would amount to total ownership rights in a tract or what
would make the existence of a use right unnecessary. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
PROPERTY 223, 295 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining how merger is used to end easements or covenants when one party separately acquires both the benefitted estate and the burdened estate).
311. 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2236–39 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
312. Id. at 2236–37.
313. Id.
314. Id.
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evening out of the benefits and burdens of economic life), and more
generally the realistic possibility of outrage over an unfair distribution
of regulatory burdens imposed on a property owner. The point is that
regulatory takings analysis needs to be tied to the same core concepts,
risks, and dangers as physical takings. Otherwise the corollary concept
of regulatory takings will become much more expansive and unwieldy
than the original defining concept of physical takings.

